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Abstract
We formally test that a process containing Brownian motion and jumps
characterises the high frequency observations for eight Asian currencies
against the US dollar. By harnessing the changes in behaviour of the
data during periods of stress we develop a new indicator to detect stress
dates in currency markets. We nd that the global share of currency trade
for each currency relates to the frequency of stress days detected. We align
the stress dates to economic and political conditions using central bank
and IMF reports on developments in currency markets.
We are grateful for comments from Yacine Aït-Sahalia, Torben Andersen, Deniz Erdem-
lioglu, Peter Reinhard Hansen, Adrian Pagan, George Tauchen, Viktor Todorov and partici-
pants at ESAM-ACE 2014, SoFiE/INET Skewness, Heavy Tails, Market Crashes, and Dynam-
ics Conference, EMG-ECB Emerging Markets Finance Conference and European University
Institute seminar. We acknowledge funding support from ARC DP130100168. Contacts:
mardi.dungey@utas.edu.au; marius.matei@utas.edu.au; sirimon.treepongkaruna@uwa.edu.au
1 Introduction
The high frequency behaviour of asset prices is important in correctly determin-
ing the pricing of derivative products, assessing market e¢ ciency and hedging
strategies particularly through estimating and forecasting volatility; Andersen et
al (2007, 2011), Zhang et al (2009), Dungey and Hvozdyk (2012). The presence
of price discontinuities, or jumps, contaminates measures such as realized volatil-
ity, and markets may well react di¤erently to movements caused by jumps than
those from an underlying continuous process; Todorov and Bollerslev (2010)1 .
Aït-Sahalia and Jacod (2008,2009,2010,2012) have developed a suite of tests to
detect the characteristics of univariate high frequency series. To date, these
tests have been applied to developed, liquid markets and support the presence
of jumps and Brownian motion in assets such as stocks of the Dow Jones 30, US
Treasuries, and the exchange rates of the Euro and Yen against the US dollar
(Aït-Sahalia and Jacod 2012, Dungey et al 2012 and Erdemlioglu et al 2013).
This paper provides a rst characterisation of these high frequency properties
for emerging market currencies. Emerging market currencies are of increasing
importance to the global economy; 27.5 percent of the currency transactions
recorded for the BIS(2013) triennial global exchange turnover survey involved
an emerging market currency.2 Transactions between the Chinese Renimibi-
yuan and US dollar alone accounted for 2.1 percent of recorded turnover. The
volume of transactions in these currencies, and expanding derivatives markets,
necessitate a stronger understanding of how their behaviour potentially di¤ers
from the more studied developed markets. Using the Aït-Sahalia and Jacod
statistics we examine the high frequency characteristics for the US dollar ex-
change rates of a group of eight Asian currencies, including both emerging and
developed markets for a sample from 1996 to 2013.
Our work extends to assess the high frequency characteristics of currencies
1Although Patton and Verardo (2012) show that estimates of realized beta are not driven
by jumps in prices ocurring on announcement days.
2Figure compiled from Table 3 in BIS(2013); classifying transactions for developing econ-
omy currencies against USD,JPY,EUR,GBP,AUD,CAD,CHF,NZD and SGD.
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during periods of calm and periods of stress and shows that there are systematic
di¤erences in the distribution of the jump detection statistics during periods of
stress. During periods of stress, the jump detection statistics are more able to
di¤erentiate jumps from noise than during periods of calm a nding which
remains consistent with recent evidence that the frequency of jumps does not
alter during periods of crisis in recent papers; Catrath et al (2014), Black et al
(2012), Novotný et al (2013).
We implement a new measure for detecting stressful periods using the char-
acteristics of high frequency data. Based on the jump detection methods using
tail observations, we propose a ratio statistic that identies the jump arrival
dates when market conditions change. The structure of the measure is related
to the existing currency stress detection work on the exchange market pressure
index originating with Eichengreen et al (1996). As in that literature we de-
termine stress dates as exceedances over a pre-determined threshold. We then
align those stress dates to the events of the identied periods using quarterly and
annual reports from central banks and IMF reports for the individual countries.
This paper shows that high frequency data can reveal periods of signicant
stress in emerging currency markets. Changes in the behaviour of the data gen-
erating process of this data occur in a manner which can provide timely warning
of stressful conditions to market participants and regulators. The conventional
approach to detecting nancial market stress and early warning systems largely
relies on lower frequency data available as either real macroeconomic indicators
or balance sheet data; Claessens and Kose (2013) provide an overview. Dating
crises with low frequency data has the advantage that it is able to detect the
presence of real economy e¤ects, so that it is clear when a crisis has become
economically costly. However, the use of high frequency data is predicated on
the idea that it is possible to calm market conditions before a full-blown crisis
emerges - the premise underlying the suite of indicators proposed in the IMF-
FSB Early Warning Exercise; see IMF(2010). Intraday data are now in use for
the measurement of systemic risk in the banking sector such as Dungey et al
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(2013), Brownlees and Engle (2012), Diebold and Yilmaz (2011).3
Our results show that each of the eight exchange rates exhibits behaviour
consistent with the presence of jumps and Brownian motion in both calm and
crisis periods of the sample. This result is consistent with the literature on US
stock and xed-income markets in Aït-Sahalia and Jacod (2012), Dungey et al
(2012) and conrms the results for the yen/US dollar exchange rate in Erdem-
lioglu et al (2013). The evidence for innite activity jumps is more mixed at
standard levels of statistical signicance. The characteristics of the distribution
of the jump detection statistics changes dramatically between pre-identied pe-
riods of nancial stress and periods of calm. Specically, during periods of stress
the kurtosis of the distribution increases dramatically  interpretable as a far
greater ability to distinguish jumps from noise during periods of stress.
We apply a rolling index of jump detection statistics to tail returns and
use it to indicate stressful events when a pre-determined threshold is exceeded.
There is a large discrepancy between the number of days highlighted for di¤erent
currencies, ranging from only 5 days in Japan and India to 26 in Malaysia. Our
alignment of the identied stress dates with central bank reports and the BIS
triennial surveys on exchange rate turnover suggests a number of important
inuences on the relative frequency of stress days.
The currencies with greater volume of trade experience fewer stress inci-
dences, although we are unable to extend this to matching with daily or trans-
actional volumes due to lack of data on currency volume at higher frequencies.
These e¤ects are potentially related to liquidity e¤ects. There is no evident
alignment between the frequency of stress days and the exchange rate regime.
However, fewer stress days are observed for developed markets than for the ma-
jority of the emerging markets. The case of India is a particularly interesting
exception to this; the rapid growth of volume in the Indian rupee, of over 60
percent per annum from 1998 to 2013 (BIS, 2013) seems to have protected it
3Daily data are used in detecting crises and bubbles in Wang and Nguyen Thi (2013), Addo
et al (2013) and Phillips and Yu (2011) and there is a considerable literature on developments
in lower frequency literature such as Phillips et al (2012) who provide a test for multiple
bubbles in monthly data.
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from exhibiting as much stress as other developing markets, although the sig-
nicant turmoil in its internal nancial markets in 2001 is clearly evident. In
the developing markets, stress relating to important political developments is
also present. An appealing feature of the stress measure proposed here is that it
clearly indicates specic periods of stress. Unlike measures of exchange market
pressure developed in Eichengreen et al (1996) and its descendants, our results
do not rely on ad hoc truncation windows to reduce the number of stress signals;
Jacobs et al (2005) overview the truncation rules used in a number of exchange
market pressure papers.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the statistics which char-
acterize the data generating process of high frequency univariate price series.
The dataset of eight exchange rates is briey outlined in Section 3. The em-
pirical results for the characteristics of this data for the full sample and during
pre-identied periods of calm and stress are reported in Section 4. Drawing on
this evidence we develop the approach to identifying stressful days using rolling
statistics with which we identify stress dates for each exchange rate and relate
this to recorded events. Section 5 concludes.
2 Modelling Framework
Assume that the price for an individual asset denoted Xt; evolves as follows:
Xt = X0 +
tZ
0
bsds+
tZ
0
sdW +
tZ
0
Z
[jxj"]
x(  v)(dsx; dx) +
tZ
0
Z
[jxj>"]
x(dsx; dx) (1)
which is a semimartingale of the form proposed by Aït-Sahalia and Jacod
(2009,2010,2012). It comprises a non-zero mean, drift, Brownian motion and
two potential jump components one representing small (innite) jumps and
the other larger (nite) jumps, separated by a threshold, ". Over a stream
of papers, Aït-Sahalia and Jacod (2008,2009,2010,2012) propose a number of
4
statistics to determine which of these potential processes are evident for an uni-
variate high frequency series. As is usual, we work in the discrete version of
this process, examining the behavior of ni X, which represents the intra-period
return for the ith period in the n intraday observations over T days.
A well-known statistic for high frequency data is the volatility proxy, realized
volatility, given as the sum of squared intra-daily returns;
RV = B(2;1;n) =
T=nX
i=1
jni Xj2 : (2)
However, this can be extended to higher powers, and for p  2 we may write
B(p;1;n) =
T=nX
i=1
jni Xjp : (3)
Further, we can also consider this statistic for a truncated section of the distri-
bution Aït-Sahalia and Jacod (2010) suggest truncating the tails, and intro-
ducing a truncation value un, such that when jni Xj > un the observation is
omitted from the statistic. We denote this as follows:
B(p; un;n) =
T=nX
i=1
jni Xjp 1fjni Xjung (4)
It turns out that we have three tools with which to describe the behavior of
high frequency nancial series; the power of the function given by p, the trun-
cation choice, un, and additionally sampling frequency. Denoting the baseline
sampling frequency as k = 1, we can then denote other frequencies using k, for
example
B(p; un; kn) =
T=nX
i=1
jkni Xjp 1fjkni Xjung: (5)
2.1 Statistics
We adopt three of the statistics to describe the behavior of high frequency data
generating processes developed in Aït-Sahalia and Jacod (2009,2010) to detect
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the presence of jumps and Brownian motion respectively. These statistics lead
naturally to a complementary measure rst proposed in Dungey et al (2012) to
detect the presence of large (positive and negative) jumps. To detect whether
a series contains statistically detectable jumps (or discontinuities) consider the
following:
SJ(p;1; k;n) = B(p;1; kn)
B(p;1;n) : (6)
The basis of the SJ statistic is that sampling the data at two di¤erent fre-
quencies, k = 1 and k > 1 (usually k is an integer, although this is not strictly
necessary), should reveal permanent discontinuities. This statistic is dened for
p > 2, and is applied across the entire distribution of returns (that is un =1).
Theoretically, in the absence of noise, this statistic converges as follows (see
Aït-Sahalia and Jacod, 2012):
SJ (p;1; k;n)t
p!

kp=2 1 no jumps
1 jumps
The second statistic detects the presence of Brownian motion as the contin-
uous component of the series. In this case the data are assessed by sampling at
two di¤erent frequencies, but with truncated distributions. That is, SW is an
inverted truncated analogy to SJ , assessed over p < 2 and k  2:
SW (p; un; k;n) =
B(p; un;n)
B(p; un; kn)
(7)
The theoretical distribution of this statistic in the absence of noise is given in
Aït-Sahalia and Jacod (2012) as follows:
SW (p; un; k;n)t
p!

k1 p=2 Brownian motion present
1 No Brownian motion
The truncation un is selected as un = 
p
BVt
! where BV is bipower variation
BV =

2

T=n
T=n   1
 T=nX
i=1
jni Xij jni Xi 1j
and  > 0 and !(0; 0:5):
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The third statistic SFA detects whether the series has nitely / innitely
many jumps on the time interval. For p > 2 and k  2; the limiting behaviour
of the following ratio
SFA (p; un; k;n) =
B(p; un; kn)
B(p; un;n)
determines whether jumps have nite or innite activity. According to Aït-
Sahalia and Jacod (2012),
SFA (p; un; k;n)t
p!

kp=2 1 nitely many jumps
1 innitely many jumps
The asymptotic variances of these statistics in order to provide standardized
statistics (normally distributed with zero mean and unit variance) are described
in Aït-Sahalia and Jacod (2008,2009,2010).
To examine the the behavior of the tails of the distribution, Dungey et al
(2012) propose a complementary statistic to indicate the presence of large jumps:
STI (p; un; k;n) =
T=nX
i=1
jkni Xjp 1fjkni Xj>ung
T=nX
i=1
jni Xjp 1fjni Xj>ung
(8)
with p > 2 and k  2:
This statistic includes both negative and positive tails. We may also calculate
positive and negative indicators for the cases where S+TI (p; un; k;n) is limited
to the cases where ni X > un and S
 
TI (p; un; k;n) is limited to the cases
where ni X <  un. As will be shown in the following section, it is the changes
in this statistic which are informative about periods of stress.
3 Data
Data are sourced from the Thomson Reuters Tick History (TRTH) database,
provided through SIRCA for the sample period January 1, 1996 to April 10,
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2013. We collate 5-minute returns for the following eight currencies against
the US dollar: Australian dollar, Indian rupee, Indonesian rupiah, Japanese
yen, Korean won, Malaysian ringgit, Singaporean dollar and Thai baht  5-
minute returns are currently the standard approach in assessments of behavior
in nancial markets; for example the recent papers of Catrath et al (2014), Black
et al (2012), Novotný et al (2013), Hanousek and Novotný (2012). Although the
foreign exchange market is open 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, we exclude data
from 00:00GMT Saturday to 24:00GMT Sunday due to thin trading. Days with
excessive missing values are also removed (common examples include Christmas
Day in some countries), otherwise where no trade occured within a 5 minute
interval a zero return was recorded. As holidays and missing data can vary with
the domestic country the number of observations is slightly di¤erent for each
exchange rate, but in general the complete sample results cover 4492 days and
over 1.2 million observations for each currency. The exact numbers are given
in Table 1.
4 Empirical Results
We estimate the values of the Aït-Sahalia and Jacod SJ ; SW ; SFA statistics
for every day in the sample. Following Aït-Sahalia and Jacod (2012) and
Erdemlioglu et al (2013), we apply the values of p = 4 and k = 2 for SJ ;
SFA; STI ; S
+
TI ; S
 
TI and p = 1 and k = 2 for SW : The truncation thresholds,
un, uses ! = 0:47 and  = 8 for SW ; SFA and  = 2 for STI ; S
+
TI ; S
 
TI : Table
1 presents the mean, median, standard deviation and kurtosis of the statistics
for each exchange rate. The presence of outliers in some currencies signicantly
a¤ects the statistics; thus Table 2 contains the same information when outliers
of value larger than 10 are excluded.
Consider rst the SJ statistics for each exchange rate. The median statistics,
both including and excluding outliers, are around 1, consistent with jumps. This
is supported by the result for the average of the formal standardized statistic
reported in Table 3 which accepts the null hypothesis of the presence of jumps.
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The histograms for the SJ statistics for each of the individual exchange rates
are shown in Figure 1. Aït-Sahalia and Jacod (2012) show how the distribution
of these collected statistics are readily interpretable  the expected mass of
SJ at value 1 is associated with the presence of jumps, mass to the left is
associated with noise, and mass far enough to the right (with k = 2; p = 4, this
is around kp=2 1 = 2) indicates the absence of jumps. Each of the currencies
are clearly modal at 1; supporting the presence of jumps, and once the outliers
are removed the standard deviations of these distributions (compare Tables 1
and 2) are relatively similar. However, they di¤er in the degree of kurtosis. The
Australian, Japanese and Singaporean currencies all have kurtosis lower than
10, once outliers are accounted for in Table 2, while kurtosis in other currencies
are as high as 55 in the Indian case. With reference to these distributions
kurtosis has a useful interpretation the more leptokurtic the distribution the
more easily the non-standardized SJ statistic will accept the null of jumps in
the system. That is, jumps are easier to di¤erentiate from noise (whether or not
there are di¤erent numbers of jumps present).
The SW statistics, reported in Tables 1 to 3, also support the presence of
Brownian motion for all currencies. With k = 2; p = 1, the value of SW consis-
tent with Brownian motion is k1 p=2 = 1:4142, and all of the results reported
in Tables 1 and 2 show that the SW from the distributions with and without
outliers removed are consistent with this. The standardized test statistics re-
ported in Table 3 fail to reject the null of the presence of Brownian motion.
Figure 2 shows the distributions of the SW statistics (without outliers) for each
of the exchange rates, where each distribution is modal around k1 p=2: Mass to
the left of this, around 1, represents the alternative of no Brownian motion and
no noise. (Mass even further left again at 1=k = 0:5 represents the case where
additive noise dominates. In all the cases represented in Figure 2 there is no
mass consistent with additive noise; see Aït-Sahalia and Jacod 2012).
The SJ and SW statistics have previously been used to test for the presence
of jumps and Brownian motion in the 30 components of the Dow Jones Industrial
Average (Aït-Sahalia and Jacod, 2009, 2012; where the analysis is conducted on
9
the pooled results, not by individual assets), for Brownian motion in Microsoft
and Intel stocks in Aït-Sahalia and Jacod (2012) and for the Japanese yen and
Euro exchange rates against the US dollar in Erdemlioglu et al (2013), each of
which supports these assets as having Brownian motion and evidence for jumps.
Thus, our results supporting the presence of jumps and Brownian motion in all
eight exchange rates are consistent with the existing evidence.
We now turn to the question of whether there is evidence of innite jump ac-
tivity as found for stocks in Aït-Sahalia and Jacod (2012). Tables 1 and 2 present
the mean and median values of SFA with and without outliers removed. These
statistics should converge to 1 under the null of innite jumps and kp=2 1 = 2
under the alternate of nite jumps. The tables and the histograms of each ex-
change rate in Figure 3 support the null. However, the standardized test results
in Table 3 do not uniformally fail to reject the null hypothesis of innite activity
in all currencies at the usual signicance levels. While the Indian, Indonesian,
Japanese, Korean and Malaysian exchange rates fail to reject innite activity
jumps at a 5 percent signicance, the Australian exchange rate is signicant at
3 percent and the Thai exchange rate at 1.4 percent. Much of the jump testing
literature imposes much higher than usual signicance for test rejection (com-
monly at 0.1 percent such as in Andersen et al 2007, Dungey et al 2009), and
we would have to adopt similarly small thresholds in order to conclude that all
the exchange rates examined here displayed innite activity jumps. The Singa-
porean exchange rates would only fail to reject the null of innite activity at
a signicance level of 0.39 percent. These mixed results present an interesting
new nding, di¤erentiating these currencies. Two of the currencies which reject
the null at 5 percent are from developed markets Australia and Singapore, of
which one is a clean oat and the other is managed and one is Thailand which
has a xed regime during part of the sample.
4.1 Periods of Stress versus Periods of Calm
To understand how the characteristics of the high frequency exchange rate data
may change during periods of stress we compare exogenously identied periods
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of nancial stress with periods of calm. We identify periods of stress from the
daily realized variance (RV) computed from the 5 minute data across the sample
for each of the 8 exchange rates. Table 4 reports the SJ ; SW ; SFA statistics for
the calmest periods in each exchange rate selected using a 90 day rolling window
of average daily RV. Table 5 reports these statistics for the most volatile period
selected in the same manner. Tables 6 and 7 report results for further instances
of volatility for each currency. These were selected by examining the RV data
for periods of sustained volatility and choosing the 90 day window with the
highest volatility.
Comparing across Tables 4 -7, the rst point to note is that the evidence
for Brownian motion and innite activity jumps, SW and SFA, is una¤ected by
whether the sample application refers to a calm or crisis period.
The SJ test statistics for each of the 8 currencies for periods of calm and
stress are consistent with the presence of jumps in each currency in each period.
However, the kurtosis computed from the SJ statistics during periods of stress
is higher than the kurtosis computed from data sampled during periods of calm,
for 7 of the 8 currencies. The exception is Thailand, which may be explained by
the xed peg regime the currency had until 1997, which makes the calm period
an atypical period - thus the two last columns in the bottom panel of Table 4
present statistics for Thailand including and excluding the xed peg currency
regime.
The change in skewness of these statistics is consistent with the presence of
crisis conditions in the underlying data, Fry et al (2010), although the properties
with the SJ transformation of this data are not as notable as in the US Treasuries
market, Dungey et al (2012). The importance of the increase in kurtosis of these
SJ statistics is that they indicate that during periods of stress the jumps are
more easily detected - the mass of these statistics is more clustered around 1:
That is, although the number of jumps may not change as evidenced elsewhere
in the literature, during stressful periods the data generating process alters in
a way that means jumps are more readily detected from noise. This provides
useful properties for the timely detection of periods of stress.
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There has been considerable debate about the role of jumps in asset prices
during periods of nancial stress. Extreme movements, and increased correla-
tion, are stylized features of periods of nancial stress, as used in the literature
on co-exceedances and copulas to capture contagion e¤ects; see for example Bae
et al (2003), Baur and Schulze (2005) and Busetti and Harvey (2011). How-
ever, tail movements and jumps are not necessarily coincident concepts. Barada
and Yasuda (2012) and Novotný et al (2013) both demonstrate that there is
not greater incidence of jump activity during crisis conditions. Hanousek and
Novotný (2012) conclude that there is therefore no need to control for jump
behaviour in stress testing volatility under Basel III.
That the SW and SFA statistics do not change much - indicating that the
evidence for the presence of Brownian motion is similar in both periods - but
that SJ is somewhat di¤erent leads us to consider the di¤erence between these
statistics. Reference to equations (6) and (7) makes it immediately apparent
that the truncation choice is the important di¤erence between them. Logically,
given that between stressful and calm periods, SJ changes and SW does not,
then the changes are occuring in the truncated section. That is, we can make
use of the statistic proposed in Dungey et al (2012), which takes advantage of
the extreme returns that is those which are captured in SJ but not in SW 
using the STI statistics outlined in equation (8): We report the values of this
statistic, and the positive and negative tail analogues S+TI and S
 
TI in Tables 1
and 2 (to conserve space we present only the STI histograms - Figure 4), which
show that as expected the mass in each case is centred around 1; supporting the
presence of both large positive and large negative jumps. However, our interest
is centred more on using the changes indicated by these statistics through time
than analysing these individual statistics.
To capture the potential for rapid change from calm to stressful conditions
we implement rolling ratios of the value Si;TI;t=Si;TI;t 1 on a daily basis to
pick up days where the extreme returns are su¢ cient to demonstrate particular
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stress in each currency. We hence consider the ratio:
Si;t =
Si;TI;t
Si;TI;t 1
where Si;t picks up periods of stress associated with changes in the value of the
domestic currency. The upshot of this statistic is that when nothing changes
between periods then Si;t = 1: Analagous ratios can be calculated for the signed
tails: S+i;t and S
 
i;t:
As a threshold value for detecting stressful periods we adapt the approach
common in the crisis detection literature of identifying a crisis when the Si;t
index exceeds some condence band beyond its median; see for example Eichen-
green et al (1996). That is creating a binary variable with the value of 1 for a
period of stress as follows:
Stressi;t =

1 when jSi;tj > esi + Si
0 otherwise
(9)
where esi is the median and Si is the standard deviation of the ratio Si for
currency i: The choice of  determines the coverage of the distribution, where
 = f1; 2; 3; 4g imply f68%; 95:5%; 99:7%; 99:9%g condence bands respectively.
Eichengreen et al (1996)4 apply  = 3, but it is also common in high frequency
data to consider  = 4 in testing for discrete jumps; see for example Dungey et
al (2009), Lahaye et al (2011).
4.2 The Stress Indices
Table 8 tabulates the number of exceedances of STI above threshold for each
currency across four di¤erent thresholds,  = f1; 2; 3; 4g and two potential values
of . The rst panel provides results when  includes all the outliers in the
sample, and unsurprisingly produces the smallest number of stress dates. The
central panel reports exceedances with  excluding outliers where Si;t exceeds
1000. The nal panel combines the dates in the top and central panel - it is
4Eichengreen et al (1996) use the mean, but due to the high evidence of outliers we
replaced mean with median.
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apparent that only a few dates from the top panel were not incorporated in the
central panel.
When outliers are included the exchange rates with the fewest exceedances
are the Australian dollar and Malaysian ringgit, with no more than 0:20 percent
exceedances at  = 1 and fewer than 0:10 percent at  = 4: India and Japan both
have 0:11 percent exceedances at  = 4; while Indonesia, Korea and Singapore
are clustered just over 0:20 percent. The highest proportions of exceedances at
all levels are found in the Thai exchange rate (0:29 percent).
After excluding outliers in calculating the critical threshold level the results
change considerably for some exchange rates (as shown in the central panel).
These results are carried into the nal panel, and our discussion centres around
those results. The exchange rates with the fewest exceedances at  = 4 are the
Japanese yen and the Indian rupee, which have around 0.11 percent periods of
stress in the sample. The Singaporean and Australian dollars have just over
0.2 percent in stress, with the Korean won just over 0.3 percent. The least
developed and relatively smaller markets for the Indonesian rupiah, the Thai
baht and Malaysian ringgit have the most exceedances - with the Malaysian
ringgit substantially more than the other rates at 0.72 percent. These relative
rankings are maintained through the di¤erent thresholds considered.
These rankings lend themselves relatively readily to analysis based on the
global volume of trade in these currencies. Table 9 provides the proportion
of global turnover in each of the currencies included in our sample from the
BIS (2013) triennial survey of currency transactions. The Japanese yen is the
third most traded curency in global turnover at 23 percent of total turnover
in 2013 (behind the US dollar and the Euro), and has been in this position
since the introduction of the Euro (see Table 2, BIS 2013). The Australian
dollar is the fth most traded at 8.6 percent of turnover, a position it took
over from the Swiss franc in 2007. (In our sample only the Japanese yen and
Australian dollar have reportable volume of trade with currencies other than
the US dollar.) The next highest ranked of our currencies in terms of global
turnover is the Singaporean dollar as 15th most traded and 1.4 percent of total
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global turnover in 2013. Thus, the three currencies with the highest volume in
our sample are clustered towards the lower end of the exceedances, suggesting
a role for turnover. (It is unfortunately not possible to obtain daily volume on
currency transactions to match our price observations to provide a more detailed
analysis of the role of volume.) The Malaysian, Thai and Indonesia currencies
all accounted for less than 0.4 percent of total turnover in 2013 - ranking 25th,
27th and 30th respectively, and were those who recorded the largest numbers of
periods of stress. The intermediate ranking of the Korean won is also reected in
its ranking as the 17th most traded currency with 1.2 percent of global turnover
in 2013.
While the association of turnover and stress exceedances is convincing, the
Indian results do not t this scenario. The market for Indian rupee has grown
ten-fold since 1998, from 0.1 percent of global turnover (or $US1.7 million) to
1.0 percent (or $US53.4 million equivalent) in 2013. This represents an average
annual growth rate of 60 percent in an environment where the total market
grew by under 15 percent per annum. Turnover in the Indian rupee is the
highest growing recorded by BIS with the exception of the Chinese Renimbi-
yuan which had no discernible volume recorded in 1998 but was the 9th most
traded currency in 2013, and matched only by the rise in the volume of New
Zealand dollar transactions from 0.2 to 2.2 percent of volume. The rise of the
Indian nancial market over our sample period is dramatic.
4.3 Stress Dates
Table 10 and Figure 5 provide the dates associated with exceedances of the 3 and
4 standard deviation thresholds for each currency in the sample, corresponding
to the last rows of each section of Table 8. The superscript 4 indicates where
the 4 standard deviation threshold was exceeded. As we have calculated two
potential candidates for  in calculating the stress dates in equation (9), in Table
10 we di¤erentiate stress dates identied only with the threshold calculated
without outliers by *, and those which occurred only when outliers were included
by **. When no stars are present both thresholds were exceeded. Thus in Table
15
10 and Figure 5, for Thailand, the date Jan 24, 1996 exceeded the four standard
deviation threshold when outliers were excluded in the calculation of ; and the
date Oct 7, 2004 exceeded the four standard deviation threshold using both
calculations of : We also record where the same dates were evident in the
signed stress indicators constructed as S+i;t and S
 
i;t. That the days associated
with negative tail volatility are 50% more numerous than those associated with
positive tail volatility indicates that stress is more often generated by negative
large jumps.
Using central bank quarterly and annual reports and IMF country reports in
what follows we relate the chronology of the periods to the stress dates exceeding
the 4 standard deviations in Table 10 (and Figure 5) for each currency. First
it is useful to note that there is no evidence of clustering across the di¤erent
exchange rates consistent with a common US based event driving the stress days.
There is some clustering in the Asian economies, particularly for Thailand in
1998 consistent with the Asian crisis. There is also a cluster of activity in 2001,
which may be consistent with the dot-com bust that year. However, as will
be shown, the individual country-based analyses are more convincing. The
emerging Asian currencies do not uctuate as much with respect to US and
European shocks, but rather are concerned with regional and local conditions.
4.3.1 Australia
The Australian results include 11 dates on which the four standard deviation
threshold is exceeded. The rst of these on August 28, 1998, corresponds to the
fall out from the Russian debt-default, the end of the speculative double-play
on the Hong Kong dollar and the rst signs of the unravelling of the hedge fund
Long-Term Capital Management. This is a particularly complex period which
involved the Australian currency via its exposure to the US Treasury markets
and commodity markets; see Dungey et al (2007) for an analysis. In March and
May 1999, improving economic conditions, the breakthrough of the US Dow
Jones index past both the 10,000 and 11,000 levels, stronger commodity prices
and an increase in long term yields associate with the stress index.
16
In 2000, the Australian dollar behaved in a way not previously seen - falling
in the face of improving domestic economic conditions, and by over 10 percent
in trade-weighted terms during that year. In the early part of the year the
Australian dollar fell on news associated with expected relative increases in US
interest rates, weakening in the domestic economy and uncertainty about the
retail impact of the Olympic games hosted in Sydney that year - including a fall
of over one cent in the value of the Australian dollar against the US dollar. In
the second half of the year investor sentiment focussed on new-technology led
growth, and disengaged from so-called old-economy investment opportunities in
Australia. These events are analysed in detail in MacFarlane (2000) and RBA
(2000).
Stress events in 2001 are all associated with the dot-com collapse, and the
reversal of the fall-out from being classied as old-economy stocks in the previous
year.
The next exceedances of the 4 standard deviation threshold for the Aus-
tralian exchange rate occur in the rst half of 2010, and these are broadly
associated with the deteriorating conditions in European debt markets and be-
haviour in commodity markets. The Australian dollar had hit a low against the
US dollar in February 2009, and began recovering thereafter although exhibiting
historically relatively high volatility (RBA 2010). In late 2010 the Australian
dollar hit parity with the US dollar, and in late December the East coast, partic-
ularly Brisbane, was hit by substantial ooding which had a signicant economic
impact on the economy.
4.3.2 India
There are 5 stress days identied in the Indian data, of which four indicate
stress in the negative tail. The rst of these is in June 1999 and corresponds
with the Kargil conict between Pakistan and India between May and July
1999. Combined with a no-condence vote in the Lok Sabha in April 1999,
and subsequent elections in the last quarter of the year, the external conditions
facing the country were described as challenging in the mid-term 1999-2000
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review of the Reserve Bank of India; RBI (1999).
The stress evident in India in 2001 is consistent with the crash in Indian
stock markets and nancial problems resulting from previous highly leveraged
positions premised on ever-rising stock prices built on the dot-com boom. Subse-
quently Indian credit ratings were downgraded in November 2001. In early 2002
India faced poor economic news and political tensions in the Indian-Pakistan
border and the Gujarat riots. Following a tightening in Indian monetary policy
in April 2007, in early August of that year the e¤ects of the developing credit
crunch emanating from the US led to a large decline in the Indian stock mar-
ket and an indicator of worsening conditions in the rst quarter of 2008. Since
that point the Indian currency markets seem not to have been subject to stress
resulting from the European debt crisis.
4.3.3 Indonesia
The 18 Indonesian exceedances largely correspond with Indonesian events in the
rst part of the sample. The rst exceedance, in April 1996, followed strong
growth results on the heels of earlier concerns about the high ination rate and
current account decit in the economy. In early 1998, in the lead up to the Asian
crisis, President Suharto nally succumbed to pressure to resign on May 21 and
the news was dominated by the poor economic outlook, including in December
1998 news that the economy shrank by over 13 percent that year with ination
of over 75 percent. During 1998 the rupiah depreciated by almost 30 percent. In
late 1999 the country was again under pressure at the end of the year associated
with the upcoming audit of the IMF program in December, a process which had
been hampered by the violence associated with the independence vote for East
Timor.
The year 2000 saw an improved economic assessment by the World Bank
and further plans to cut the budget decit but by April that year falls in the
equity market, along with an agreement of terms for the IMF programs in May
2000, caused pressure in the currency markets. A new Indonesian Government
was elected in August 2001, consistent with the stress date noted in the table.
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Indonesian economic conditions were the primary source of exceedances in
2002; including the announcement of the removal of petrol subsidies on Jan-
uary 24, 2002 associated with a negative tail stress date, a worsening current
account position and falling coal prices (Indonesia is one of the worlds largest
producers of coal). The March 11, 2002 date corresponds to the beginning of
talks to determine international borders with East Timor which gained formal
independence on May 20.
Political uncertainty was dominant in 2004, with the Indonesian elections
beginning in April and concluding in late September with the rst democrat-
ically elected President. On October 4, 2004, one of the identied (negative)
stress dates, the Governor of the Bank of Indonesia delivered a talk to the IMF
highlighting these achievements and the improved outlook as Indonesia exited
from the nal IMF programs associated with the 1998 crisis; Boedino (2004).
The exogenous event of the tsunami which hit Indonesia on December 26,
2004 was felt in the currency markets in the rst week of 2005 as a negative
stress date. During 2005 the rupiah depreciated, and the Bank of Indonesia
implemented a number of regulations designed to reduce volatility and specu-
lative transactions; these included restrictions on derivatives, on rupiah trading
with non-residents and expanding the instruments available for Bank of Indone-
sia intervention. On November 1, 2005 the Bank of Indonesia increased the BI
interest rate by 125 basis points, but this was followed during the month by
the release of further evidence of higher ination (at an annual rate of 18.38%
for headline ination and 42.78% for administered prices including an increase
in fuel prices) which corresponds with the identied stress date in the table.
This was followed by further bans on margin trading of the rupiah, currency
swap intervention and a tightening of the net open market position that banks
can hold in foreign exchange. Consequently, in 2006 volume in the swap mar-
kets was reduced by almost one-third and volatility declined; Bank of Indonesia
(2005,2006).
In the rst half of 2006 the Indonesian rupiah appreciated along with most
other Asian currencies as a result of uncertainty about the timing of the turning
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point in the US monetary policy cycle (ultimately the completion of the tight-
ening cycle in May) and capital inows in the rst part of the year. May saw
the rst of the three credit rating agency upgrades of Indonesian debt.
By comparison the Indonesian rupiah has experienced relatively little stress
associated with the global nancial crisis, showing only one (positive) stress
date on April 2, 2009, aligned with the G-20 meetings of nance ministers to
discuss the global nancial crisis.
4.3.4 Japan
There are only 5 stress dates indicated for the Japanese exchange rate, and they
are generally not signed (that is they do not associate with one tail but with
a more general increase in volatility from both tails). In late 2008, concerns
were expressed over the length of the recovery from crisis, expressed particu-
larly in July and October that year, although October 7 also aligns with the
ratication of the Troubled Assets Relief Program in the US. The election of a
new Government in Japan, overcoming the ruling coalition and appointment of
a new Prime Minister is associated with stress in September 2009. News of a
worsening outlook for Japanese debt issued by Moodys aligns with the Febru-
ary 22, 2011 date. In early 2012 the yen su¤ered a substantial depreciation; the
early February stress date noted here is consistent with the emerging pressure
associated with the expansion of the Bank of Japan asset buying program.
4.3.5 Korea
The 15 stress days for Korea feature a cluster at the beginning of the sample
associated with the transition from an exchange rate regime with a limited band
to a more exible regime in December 1997, part of the terms of an IMF relief
package. Early in the sample there are consequently a number of stress dates
indicating that the xed exchange rate regime was under pressure, and the
existing stress associated with adjusting to the new regime in early 1998.
Korea implemented signicant restructuring of its nancial sector in 2001.
The year was punctuated by drops in the KOPSI su¢ cient to prompt support
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from the Government, including its largest one-day drop on September 12, 2001
following the terrorist attacks in the US. Throughout this year Government re-
forms included the liquidation of some nancial institutions and recapitalization
funding. Coupled with the dot-com crisis in the US, these reforms are likely to be
associated with the stress dates detected in that year and into early 2002; BOK
(2002). The October 2005 negative stress date is associated with a short-lived
appreciation in the won, beginning around October 14, and ending abruptly
almost a fortnight later, accompanied at the time by concerns about interven-
tion by the Bank of Korea. The stress date on 27 May 2008 corresponds to the
announcement of Asian central bank interventions to support depreciating local
currencies.
4.3.6 Malaysia
Malaysia experiences very few of its 26 stress dates in the rst half of the sample.
A small cluster appears in the second half of 1999 and early 2000. In July
2005 Malaysia returned to a managed oat exchange rate regime. Initially, the
central bank intervened frequently to maintain a stable exchange rate (Aziz
2013) and this corresponds with multiple stress negative tail dates during this
period. Aziz (2013) records that Bank Negara intervention activity subsequently
decreased, but was extensive during 2007-2008. Intervention was su¢ cient to
increase international reserves by 50 percent between January 2007 and June
2008, and subsequently to reduce them by $US32 billion between September
2008 and April 2009. As with other Asian economies, Malaysia experienced
strong capital investment outow during 2008 as a consequence of the global
nancial conditions.
The stress date on October 29, 2008 is likely to be related to the general
crash in Asian stock markets on that day, with the Hong Kong market falling
by 12 percent and the Nikkei reaching a 20 year low. This followed the events in
Europe over previous weeks which saw a signicant number of countries appeal
to the IMF for emergency aid, and was associated with a dramatic global loss
of condence. In the rst months of 2013 the Malaysian ringgit exhibited some
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upward (positive and general) stress, as it appreciated against the US dollar.
4.3.7 Singapore
In Singapore, 10 dates are identied as exceeding the 4 standard deviation
threshold. Throughout 1997 and 1998 the events identied are associated with
the Asian nancial crisis, and reect the changing status of Singaporean as-
sets to more aligned with regional problems during that period. From 1999
US economic conditions were responsible for most instances of pressure, and
this feature prevailed until late 2010. From that period the US e¤ects were
punctuated by instances of Singaporean based news - particularly the varying
expectations for Singaporean growth.
4.3.8 Thailand
Of the 19 stress days identied for Thailand, most occur between 1996 and
1998. Thailand transitted from a xed exchange rate regime to a more exible
regime during the 1997-1998 Asian crisis period; with the date of the oat of
the Thai baht on July 2, 1997 often given as the starting point for the crisis.
Unsurprisingly the Thai baht exhibits many stress dates in the period leading
up to the crisis and during its course, many of these dates are evident in the
negative tails or across both tails. The IMF programs for Thailand underwent
9 di¤erent negotiations between August 1997 and September 1999, and the
uncertainty around these changing plans contributed to stress in the currency
during this period; Goldstein et al (2003) provide a review of the extent of the
IMF conditionality and structural reforms requested for Thailand, Indonesia
and Korea.
From 2003 to 2006 there is one stress date indicated in each year. The Sep-
tember 2006 positive stress date reects uncertainty corresponding to the after-
math of the coup on September 19. Pressure on the baht that year ultimately
led to the imposition of short-term capital ow restrictions in Thailand from
December. In June and July 2008 the Thai stock market experienced an out-
ow of international investors, partly in response to the worsening international
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situation and general ight to quality. By July 2009 the economic recovery was
slowing, with a contracting export sector (somewhat o¤set by lower oil prices)
and continued deationary pressures.
5 Conclusion
The features of the high frequency nancial data are important in pricing deriv-
ative products, hedging and volatility forecasting. While there is evidence for
liquid, developed markets that these data are consistent with the presence of
jumps and Brownian motion, this paper is the rst to contribute formal evi-
dence for Brownian motion and jumps in the exchange rates for emerging Asian
markets against the US dollar. The evidence for innite activity in the jump
process in these currencies is mixed.
The paper examines the exchange rates for eight Asian currencies against
the US dollar Australian dollar, Indian rupee, Indonesian rupiah, Japanese
yen, Korean won, Malaysian ringgit, Singaporean dollar and Thai baht over
the period 1996 to 2013. The sample period allows us to determine whether the
evidence for the composition of the data generating process changes between
periods of calm and stress. We nd that although the evidence for Brownian
motion (and innite activity jumps) does not change, the ability to di¤erentiate
jumps from noise is improved during periods of stress. Taking advantage of this
characteristic, we develop an index to detect the emergence of stressful periods in
the markets. The stress index compares the jump characteristics of tail returns
over consecutive periods to obtain a measure of the extent of change; when
this change exceeds a pre-determined threshold we identify a stressful day for
the currency in question. This approach adopts some of the methodologies for
determining stress thresholds from the widely used exchange market pressure
index pioneered by Eichengreen et al (1996), but has the advantage of not
requiring ad hoc truncation choices to di¤erentiate stress dates.
Using central bank and IMF reports we successfully align the stress dates
identied for each currency with the economic conditions and events of the pe-
23
riod. In general, the currencies experiencing the fewest stress days are those
with the greatest global volume according to the BIS (2013) triennial survey of
foreign exchange activity. Emerging markets typically experience more stress
days, although India is a particular exception. The massive growth in volume of
trade in the Indian rupee over the sample period may be a contributing factor 
but does not mask all internal stressful events. Signicant political events, such
as coups or uncertainty about future governments are evident in the currency
stress days identied. There is no readily apparent relationship between the
numbers of stress days and exchange rate regime, although a clustering of stress
dates relates to intervention measures taken to calm volatility in the Malaysian
ringitt after the currency was reoated, and others are associated with the im-
plementation of regulatory policies to reduce (speculative) derivative trading in
Indonesia. In general, currencies showed higher sensitivity to local announce-
ments than to relevant international news.
In summary, we provide evidence on the high frequency characteristics of
the exchange rates for a number of currencies for emerging and developed Asian
markets, and show how changes in these characteristics can be used to detect
periods of stress in these markets. As a result we anticipate that incorporating
high frequency stress signalling with conventional macroeconomic based indica-
tors may improve the performance of early warning indicators; this is the focus
of future work.
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Table 1: Aït-Sahalia and Jacod test statistics for exchange rates against the US
dollar: 1996-2013: non-standardized, no truncation
Statistic Australia India Indonesia Japan Korea Malaysia Singapore Thailand
Mean
SJ 1.4174 1.1682 1.0999 1.5239 1.1562 22.3771 1.1363 0.8857
SW 1.4654 1.3999 1.3284 1.4995 1.4559 1.3774 1.5015 1.3949
SFA 1.3880 1.0358 0.9402 1.4814 1.2284 0.9973 1.0792 0.8463
STI 1.7296 1.1722 1.1034 1.8502 1.1701 22.4010 1.3075 0.8993
S+TI 1.8992 1.2443 1.0643 2.0205 3.5823 73.5752 1.3699 0.9131
S TI 1.9038 1.8792 1.2528 2.0287 1.2419 3.4144 1.3658 0.9236
Median
SJ 1.3003 1.0000 0.9998 1.3540 1.0028 1.0000 1.0000 0.8763
SW 1.4583 1.3639 1.2904 1.4871 1.4041 1.3600 1.4939 1.3549
SFA 1.2848 0.9835 0.8631 1.3351 1.0523 0.9113 0.9823 0.8201
STI 1.4966 1.0001 1.0000 1.5873 1.0036 1.0000 1.0762 0.8826
S+TI 1.4859 1.0000 0.9914 1.5763 1.0021 1.0000 1.0233 0.8698
S TI 1.4642 1.0000 0.9978 1.5715 1.0002 1.0000 1.0356 0.8755
Standard deviation
SJ 0.6836 7.6989 0.7576 0.8186 0.6663 1226.6481 1.9394 0.7072
SW 0.1129 0.2286 0.2693 0.1374 0.8168 0.2686 0.1794 0.5892
SFA 0.7023 0.6609 2.5701 0.7947 1.0538 0.8408 0.7035 0.4693
STI 1.0826 7.7938 0.7662 1.1477 0.6878 1226.6483 2.0798 0.9273
S+TI 1.5793 9.7983 0.8664 1.6465 148.0897 4235.7537 2.3388 0.7168
S TI 1.6084 26.7742 3.7077 1.6414 0.8937 105.0072 2.7585 1.2011
Kurtosis
SJ 6.00 4359.58 45.38 32.46 99.71 3622.43 1999.46 1267.27
SW 1.08 38.87 43.58 571.13 3276.80 392.87 3.68 1704.87
SFA 25.42 375.17 3603.24 32.83 594.82 501.66 386.66 246.97
STI 40.93 4361.21 44.22 27.52 89.42 3622.43 1705.66 2202.61
S+TI 17.31 3647.93 119.26 17.94 4320.10 3546.23 2105.55 82.39
S TI 24.47 3144.48 3486.97 15.95 24.22 3484.83 3231.47 1882.34
N 1294272 1294272 1293984 1294272 1293408 1293696 1294272 1294272
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Table 2: Aït-Sahalia and Jacod test statistics for exchange rates against the US
dollar: 1996-2013: non-standardized, outliers greater than 10 removed
Statistic Australia India Indonesia Japan Korea Malaysia Singapore Thailand
Mean
SJ 1.4174 1.0390 1.0945 1.5205 1.1499 1.1647 1.0977 0.8780
SW 1.4654 1.3999 1.3284 1.4995 1.4438 1.3742 1.5015 1.3826
SFA 1.3856 1.0281 0.8876 1.4782 1.2083 0.9813 1.0703 0.8406
STI 1.7210 1.0415 1.0979 1.8404 1.1638 1.1764 1.2674 0.8877
S+TI 1.8560 1.0544 1.0590 1.9618 1.2921 1.1261 1.3026 0.9052
S TI 1.8458 1.1084 1.1877 1.9697 1.2386 1.1548 1.3218 0.8998
Median
SJ 1.3003 1.0000 0.9998 1.3540 1.0027 1.0000 1.0000 0.8763
SW 1.4583 1.3639 1.2904 1.4871 1.4040 1.3600 1.4939 1.3548
SFA 1.2847 0.9832 0.8623 1.3350 1.0511 0.9111 0.9823 0.8199
STI 1.4957 1.0001 1.0000 1.5861 1.0036 1.0000 1.0758 0.8826
S+TI 1.4814 1.0000 0.9914 1.5698 1.0019 1.0000 1.0220 0.8686
S TI 1.4573 1.0000 0.9977 1.5632 1.0002 1.0000 1.0353 0.8750
Standard deviation
SJ 0.6836 0.4646 0.7120 0.7863 0.5972 0.9332 0.5940 0.4843
SW 0.1129 0.2286 0.2693 0.1374 0.2615 0.2121 0.1794 0.2625
SFA 0.6839 0.5369 0.4403 0.7663 0.7478 0.5742 0.5550 0.3836
STI 1.0172 0.4722 0.7207 1.0780 0.6208 0.9484 0.8135 0.5073
S+TI 1.4067 0.5748 0.7951 1.4184 0.9265 0.9128 1.0135 0.6443
S TI 1.3712 0.7071 1.0043 1.4274 0.8674 0.9802 1.0282 0.6031
Kurtosis
SJ 6.00 55.66 14.87 6.80 23.13 24.57 9.99 17.44
SW 1.08 38.87 43.58 571.13 111.65 13.43 3.68 260.81
SFA 15.21 17.46 36.67 12.76 8.35 44.09 18.37 7.13
STI 4.42 55.25 14.88 3.24 21.75 23.07 12.02 16.62
S+TI 4.49 43.62 16.34 3.35 9.78 18.02 6.40 26.64
S TI 4.74 23.89 11.97 3.01 11.19 18.44 7.87 18.92
N 1294272 1294272 1293984 1294272 1293408 1293696 1294272 1294272
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Table 3: Standardized t-statistics for exchange rates against the US dollar:
average for sample period
Statistic Australia India Indonesia Japan Korea Malaysia Singapore Thailand
no truncationcSJ -0.7419 -0.5353 -0.7974 -0.6239 -0.5881 13.7154 -1.2082 -1.3002dSW 0.6898 -0.0860 -0.4439 1.0997 0.2441 -0.1728 1.1806 -0.1158dSFA -2.1314 -1.7751 -1.6029 -1.8966 -1.4010 -1.1582 -2.8700 -2.4682
outliers larger than 10 removedcSJ -0.7419 -0.7151 -0.8021 -0.6283 -0.5936 -0.7450 -1.2533 -1.3176dSW 0.6898 -0.0860 -0.4439 1.0997 0.2060 -0.1783 1.1806 -0.1410dSFA -2.1404 -1.7751 -1.6917 -1.9077 -1.4316 -1.1735 -2.8922 -2.4755
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Table 4: Aït-Sahalia and Jacod statistics for calm sub-periods: selected as lowest
90 day moving average RV in each sample
Statistic Australia India Indonesia Japan
Start 26-Jul-96 16-Apr-97 24-Sep-96 4-Jul-12
End 28-Nov-96 19-Aug-97 27-Jan-97 6-Nov-12
SJ Mean 1.1442 1.0091 0.9227 1.3693
Median 1.0845 0.9998 0.9884 1.2304
Skew 0.7090 0.0152 0.6808 1.0932
Kurtosis 0.5085 7.6951 2.7610 1.3138
SW Mean 1.4193 1.4541 1.2016 1.5973
Median 1.4063 1.4011 1.1839 1.5785
Skew 1.0035 0.7907 0.7501 0.4918
Kurtosis 6.6588 0.1512 1.3177 -0.4558
SFA Mean 1.1063 0.9595 0.8549 1.3303
Median 1.0540 0.8918 0.8495 1.1813
Skew 0.6662 2.2011 0.3561 1.1232
Kurtosis 0.1794 6.8492 1.2435 1.5116
Korea Malaysia Singapore Thailanda Thailandb
Start 26-Jan-96 23-Aug-05 28-Aug-96 09-Sep-96 29-Oct-03
End 7-Jun-96 3-Jan-06 31-Dec-96 10-Jan-97 02-Mar-04
SJ Mean 1.3375 0.9113 0.9345 0.9678 0.8370
Median 1.0000 0.9473 0.8912 0.9899 0.8879
Skew 1.8582 1.7440 1.0815 1.8475 0.4553
Kurtosis 3.3914 5.4564 1.9454 9.2329 1.9133
SW Mean 1.4619 1.3396 1.3675 1.2353 1.2505
Median 1.4167 1.3204 1.3569 1.2093 1.2194
Skew 0.8949 0.9949 0.8381 0.9267 3.2633
Kurtosis 0.7179 1.0978 2.1580 1.6806 17.1642
SFA Mean 1.0404 0.7805 0.8280 0.8650 0.8336
Median 0.8542 0.7717 0.7968 0.8879 0.8187
Skew 3.4098 1.2715 1.4393 0.9758 -0.0069
Kurtosis 17.5401 5.9048 4.4479 4.1404 -0.1863
aSelection of the calmest sample includes the pre-oat period.
bSelection of the calmest sample excludes the pre-oat period.
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Table 5: Aït-Sahalia and Jacod statistics for the most volatile sub-
periods:selected as highest 90 day moving average RV in each sample (excluding
outliers greater than 10)
Statistic Australia India Indonesia Japan
Start 6-Oct-08 18-Sep-08 31-Aug-10 10-Sep-98
End 6-Feb-09 21-Jan-09 3-Jan-11 13-Jan-99
SJ Mean 1.6857 1.2950 1.1634 1.4800
Median 1.5992 1.0008 1.0053 1.3858
Skew 0.8873 3.8234 4.3935 1.0052
Kurtosis 1.2695 14.5242 23.3648 2.7938
SW Mean 1.4185 1.3387 1.3259 1.4242
Median 1.4042 1.3427 1.3258 1.4071
Skew 0.3840 1.0179 0.3594 0.8070
Kurtosis -0.2991 8.8455 1.3596 0.8820
SFA Mean 1.6318 1.1969 0.9631 1.4675
Median 1.5685 1.1167 1.0000 1.3376
Skew 0.8346 4.6590 -0.0795 1.7729
Kurtosis 1.3344 33.7161 0.5715 5.8538
Korea Malaysia Singapore Thailand
Start 20-Nov-97 7-Jan-98 13-Jul-98 26-Jun-07
End 25-Mar-98 12-May-98 17-Nov-98 29-Oct-07
SJ Mean 1.2589 0.9373 0.8468 0.7849
Median 1.0053 0.8124 0.9228 0.7949
Skew 2.7892 2.2934 0.8036 -0.5324
Kurtosis 11.4691 8.6842 1.9498 -0.5975
SW Mean 1.4632 1.4257 1.3655 2.0445 (1.4324)
Median 1.4278 1.4168 1.3599 1.2933 (1.2813)
Skew 0.6572 0.8365 0.9514 6.7472 (2.4570)
Kurtosis 0.4184 1.7866 3.4392 49.4623 (8.3667)
SFA Mean 1.6553 (1.0049) 0.9034 0.8846 0.7456
Median 0.9239 (0.9175) 0.7970 0.8999 0.7726
Skew 7.8856 (2.0817) 1.9630 0.3697 0.1344
Kurtosis 66.1589 (6.9100) 6.3221 0.5041 3.6399
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Table 6: Aït-Sahalia and Jacod statistics for the further periods of stress iden-
tied using RV (excluding outliers greater than 10)
Statistic India
Start 15-Mar-96 18-Nov-97 31-Aug-10 17-Aug-11
End 25-Jul-96 23-Mar-98 3-Jan-11 20-Dec-11
SJ Mean 1.0846 1.1016 1.1634 1.1479
Median 1.0000 1.0008 1.0053 1.0024
Skew 3.3274 3.7104 4.3935 6.9393
Kurtosis 15.7301 22.2699 23.3648 55.3448
SW Mean 1.4400 1.3823 1.3259 1.3360
Median 1.4232 1.3591 1.3258 1.2945
Skew 0.4339 0.0069 0.3594 3.8864
Kurtosis 0.7972 2.2525 1.3596 25.1220
SFA Mean 0.9927 0.9999 0.9631 1.1983
Median 0.9189 0.9989 1.0000 1.1215
Skew 2.3843 1.6337 -0.0795 2.4086
Kurtosis 9.2976 4.5038 0.5715 13.3224
Indonesia
Start 13-May-98 26-Nov-98 20-Jul-01 21-Oct-08
End 18-Sep-98 1-Apr-99 22-Nov-01 23-Feb-09
SJ Mean 0.7707 0.8673 1.0497 0.9908
Median 0.8005 0.8272 0.9826 1.0000
Skew 0.7214 2.0431 2.1821 0.9805
Kurtosis 3.6987 8.9441 7.2915 7.5264
SW Mean 1.3138 1.3570 1.3898 1.2645
Median 1.2819 1.3499 1.3782 1.2102
Skew 0.6536 0.8455 0.5108 1.4527
Kurtosis 0.9367 2.4128 0.3784 2.3585
SFA Mean 0.7962 0.7905 1.0230 (0.8738) 0.8691
Median 0.8278 0.8042 0.7959 (0.7907) 0.9727
Skew 0.2380 0.5424 7.7376 (1.5752) 0.1196
Kurtosis 0.6390 1.7838 66.8680 (4.0584) 1.7805
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Table 7: Aït-Sahalia and Jacod statistics for the further periods of stress iden-
tied using RV (excluding outliers greater than 10)
Statistic Australia Japan Korea
Start 9-Jun-98 13-Feb-01 8-Sep-08 4-Mar-02 3-Sep-08
End 15-Oct-98 18-Jun-01 9-Jan-09 5-Jul-02 6-Jan-09
SJ Mean 1.4401 1.3514 1.4983 1.0008 1.2091
Median 1.2482 1.2019 1.3963 1.0000 1.0084
Skew 2.3372 3.0500 1.5475 1.3623 3.2335
Kurtosis 8.7125 17.6802 4.3020 29.3264 10.9540
SW Mean 1.3668 1.3756 1.4591 1.3611 1.4392
Median 1.3633 1.3699 1.4445 1.1974 1.3960
Skew 0.5630 0.5428 0.6119 2.2459 1.0484
Kurtosis 0.2550 0.4295 0.4428 6.6041 1.0106
SFA Mean 1.2791 1.2859 1.6342 (1.4773) 1.4222 1.2135
Median 1.2098 1.2290 1.3764 (1.3692) 1.0000 1.1044
Skew 0.5442 0.4693 6.6987 (1.7566) 1.7882 1.5036
Kurtosis 0.6089 0.0264 54.4218 (5.0507) 3.2923 3.1692
Malaysia Singapore Thailand
Start 7-Jul-11 8-Sep-08 5-Aug-11 30-May-97
End 9-Nov-11 9-Jan-09 8-Dec-11 07-Oct-97
SJ Mean 1.6801 (1.1792) 1.3648 1.4318 0.7686
Median 1.0000 (1.0000) 1.2739 1.3717 0.7317
Skew 6.3621 (1.7808) 1.1848 2.1357 0.6207
Kurtosis 43.1688 (3.1885) 2.6604 9.3919 1.8087
SW Mean 1.4442 1.4701 1.5386 1.4061
Median 1.4071 1.4762 1.5295 1.3705
Skew 1.1635 0.4613 0.7350 0.1518
Kurtosis 1.4805 1.8340 1.7436 0.9114
SFA Mean 0.9941 1.3381 1.4402 0.7437
Median 0.9034 1.2739 1.3529 0.6932
Skew 1.3499 0.5567 3.7447 0.5227
Kurtosis 3.7679 0.3977 23.8646 0.9551
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Table 8: Number and proportion of days above threshold value for stress index
for January 1996 to March 2013
Days Australia India Indonesia Japan Korea Malaysia Singapore Thailand
Stress Days with all data included in calculation of threshold 
Above  9 19 27 26 19 6 31 31
(%) 0.20 0.44 0.62 0.58 0.43 0.17 0.69 0.69
Above 2 5 9 18 8 15 4 21 18
(%) 0.11 0.21 0.41 0.18 0.34 0.11 0.47 0.40
Above 3 2 6 12 6 13 3 13 14
(%) 0.04 0.14 0.27 0.13 0.30 0.08 0.29 0.31
Above 4 2 5 9 5 10 2 10 13
(%) 0.04 0.11 0.21 0.11 0.23 0.06 0.22 0.29
Stress Days with outliers excluded in calculation of threshold 
Above  59 19 46 26 26 52 31 46
(%) 1.31 0.44 1.05 0.58 0.59 1.43 0.69 1.03
Above 2 23 9 25 8 16 35 21 29
(%) 0.51 0.21 0.57 0.18 0.36 0.97 0.47 0.65
Above 3 16 6 22 6 13 28 13 22
(%) 0.36 0.14 0.50 0.13 0.30 0.77 0.29 0.49
Above 4 10 5 17 5 13 24 10 16
(%) 0.22 0.11 0.39 0.11 0.30 0.66 0.22 0.36
Stress Days identied with either calculation of threshold 
Above  60 19 47 26 28 58 31 49
(%) 1.34 0.44 1.08 0.58 0.64 1.60 0.69 1.09
Above 2 24 9 26 8 18 39 21 32
(%) 0.53 0.21 0.60 0.18 0.41 1.08 0.47 0.71
Above 3 17 6 23 6 15 31 13 25
(%) 0.38 0.14 0.53 0.13 0.34 0.85 0.29 0.56
Above 4 11 5 18 5 15 26 10 19
(%) 0.24 0.11 0.41 0.11 0.34 0.72 0.22 0.42
Total days 4,493 4,365 4,364 4,493 4,390 3,626 4,489 4,485
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Table 9: Share and rank of sample currencies global exchange market turnover
Currency 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013
Share Rank Share % Rank Share % Rank Share % Rank Share % Rank Share % Rank
US 86.8 1 89.9 1 88.0 1 85.6 1 84.9 1 87.0 1
Japan 21.7 2 23.5 3 20.8 3 17.2 3 19.0 3 23.0 3
Australia 3.0 6 4.3 7 6.0 6 6.6 6 7.6 5 8.6 5
Singapore 1.1 7 1.1 12 0.9 14 1.2 13 1.4 12 1.4 15
Korea 0.2 18 0.8 15 1.1 11 1.2 14 1.5 11 1.2 17
India 0.1 22 0.2 21 0.3 20 0.7 19 1.0 15 1.0 20
Malaysia 0.0 27 0.1 26 0.1 30 0.1 28 0.3 25 0.4 25
Thailand 0.1 19 0.2 24 0.2 22 0.2 25 0.2 26 0.3 27
Indonesia 0.1 25 0.0 28 0.1 27 0.1 29 0.2 30 0.2 30
Adjusted for local and cross-border inter-dealer double-counting. As two currencies are
involved in each transactions total volumes total to 200% rather than 100%. Source: BIS
(2013) Table 2.
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Australia India Indonesia Japan Korea Malaysia Singapore Thailand
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Days exceeding 4 standard deviations over the median + (-) indicates positive (negative) stress day
* Standard deviation was calculated by excluding the outliers (values bigger than 1000)
** Standard deviation was calculated considering all the data (including outliers)
When no star, days were selected with both criteria
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Table 10: Days with Si,t exceeding 3 standard deviations over the median
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Figure 3: Non-standardized SFA
AUD IDR
INR JPY
KRW MYR
SGD THB
41
0
10
20
0
.0
0
0
.2
5
0
.5
0
0
.7
5
1
.0
0
1
.2
5
1
.5
0
1
.7
5
2
.0
0
2
.2
5
2
.5
0
2
.7
5
3
.0
0
3
.2
5
3
.5
0
3
.7
5
4
.0
0
4
.2
5
4
.5
0
4
.7
5
5
.0
0
0
10
20
30
0
.0
0
0
.2
5
0
.5
0
0
.7
5
1
.0
0
1
.2
5
1
.5
0
1
.7
5
2
.0
0
2
.2
5
2
.5
0
2
.7
5
3
.0
0
3
.2
5
3
.5
0
3
.7
5
4
.0
0
4
.2
5
4
.5
0
4
.7
5
5
.0
0
0
10
20
30
0
.0
0
0
.2
5
0
.5
0
0
.7
5
1
.0
0
1
.2
5
1
.5
0
1
.7
5
2
.0
0
2
.2
5
2
.5
0
2
.7
5
3
.0
0
3
.2
5
3
.5
0
3
.7
5
4
.0
0
4
.2
5
4
.5
0
4
.7
5
5
.0
0
0
10
20
0
.0
0
0
.2
5
0
.5
0
0
.7
5
1
.0
0
1
.2
5
1
.5
0
1
.7
5
2
.0
0
2
.2
5
2
.5
0
2
.7
5
3
.0
0
3
.2
5
3
.5
0
3
.7
5
4
.0
0
4
.2
5
4
.5
0
4
.7
5
5
.0
0
0
10
20
0
.0
0
0
.2
5
0
.5
0
0
.7
5
1
.0
0
1
.2
5
1
.5
0
1
.7
5
2
.0
0
2
.2
5
2
.5
0
2
.7
5
3
.0
0
3
.2
5
3
.5
0
3
.7
5
4
.0
0
4
.2
5
4
.5
0
4
.7
5
5
.0
0
0
10
20
0
.0
0
0
.2
5
0
.5
0
0
.7
5
1
.0
0
1
.2
5
1
.5
0
1
.7
5
2
.0
0
2
.2
5
2
.5
0
2
.7
5
3
.0
0
3
.2
5
3
.5
0
3
.7
5
4
.0
0
4
.2
5
4
.5
0
4
.7
5
5
.0
0
0
10
20
0
.0
0
0
.2
5
0
.5
0
0
.7
5
1
.0
0
1
.2
5
1
.5
0
1
.7
5
2
.0
0
2
.2
5
2
.5
0
2
.7
5
3
.0
0
3
.2
5
3
.5
0
3
.7
5
4
.0
0
4
.2
5
4
.5
0
4
.7
5
5
.0
0
0
10
20
30
0
.0
0
0
.2
5
0
.5
0
0
.7
5
1
.0
0
1
.2
5
1
.5
0
1
.7
5
2
.0
0
2
.2
5
2
.5
0
2
.7
5
3
.0
0
3
.2
5
3
.5
0
3
.7
5
4
.0
0
4
.2
5
4
.5
0
4
.7
5
5
.0
0
Figure 4: Non-standardized STI
AUD IDR
INR JPY
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Figure 5: Days with Si,t exceeding 3 standard deviations over the median
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